Heideggers Critique of Cartesianism Essays -- Philosophy Papers

Heidegger is one of the few Western thinkers to hire succeeded in going beyond the Western philosophic tradition. Because his radical criticism is believed to have fractured the foundations of modern philosophy, his thinking is usually at the center of the controversy in the midst of the defenders of the tradition and those who wish to break with it and start afresh. In the heat of this debate, the interrogative of Heideggers place in relation to that tradition in general and to Cartesianism in particular has been neglected. I wish to address the question by counsel on the major aspects of Heideggers critique of Cartesian philosophy and the modern tradition. I will first show that the strength of his criticism lies in its encompassing penetration of the foundations of modern philosophy, running through both the ontological and epistemic channels. Ontologically, Heidegger presents a critique of subjectivism epistemologically, he discredits the correspondence conception of truth a nd its underlying visual metaphor. I will then look at his ascertain of history and the meaning of his concept of overcoming in order to show that his beget is not to destroy the tradition, but to provide a wider basis for it by rescuing forgotten elements imbedded in the tradition itself. Finally, I will show that in this process of overcoming, Heidegger did not really depart from the tradition, but absorbed well-nigh of its basic tenets, as his concept of death echoes major elements of Cartesian doubt. 1. The reassessment of SubjectivismOne of the major features of Heideggers thinking is his criticism of Cartesian subjectivity. According to Heidegger, in regarding the ego cogito as the guarantor of its own continuing existence and as the basis of all things... ...d Basil Blackwell, 1980) Abbau can be find Heideggers sanctioned Problems of Phenomenology (Bloomington atomic number 49 University Press, 1982) Verbindung is discussed mainly in The Principle of Identity, in Iden tity and end (New York Harper and Row, 1969, pp. 23-41) for Uberwindung see Heideggers Nietzsche.(4) Nietzsche, vol. 4 p. 97. See Aristotles words that which is called a contentedness most strictly, primarily, and most of all, is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g., the individual man or the individual horse. (Aristotles Categories, 2a 11-13).(5) Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology p.111.(6) Heidegger M., communion on Thinking New York Harper and Row, 1966, p. 7.(7) Nietzsche, vol. 4, p. 106.(8) Heidegger, M. History of the Concept of Time, Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1992, pp. 316-317.